During the 1990s Argentina was the only country in Latin America to combine radical economic reform and full democracy. In 2001, however, the country fell into a deep political and economic crisis and was widely seen as a basket case. This book explores both developments, examining the links between the (real and apparent) successes of the 1990s and the 2001 collapse. Specific topics include economic policymaking and reform, executive-legislative relations, the judiciary, federalism, political parties and the party system, and new patterns of social protest. Beyond its empirical analysis, the book contributes to several theoretical debates in comparative politics. Contemporary studies of political institutions focus almost exclusively on institutional design, neglecting issues of enforcement and stability. Yet a major problem in much of Latin America is that institutions of diverse types have often failed to take root. Besides examining the effects of institutional weakness, the book also uses the Argentine case to shed light on four other areas of current debate: tensions between radical economic reform and democracy; political parties and contemporary crises of representation; links between subnational and national politics; and the transformation of state-society relations in the post-corporatist era. Besides the editors, the contributors are Javier Auyero, Ernesto Calvo, Kent Eaton, Sebasti&án Etchemendy, Gretchen Helmke, Wonjae Hwang, Mark Jones, Enrique Peruzzotti, Pablo T. Spiller, Mariano Tommasi, and Juan Carlos Torre.

Tapa blanda

Penn Satate University Press

Argentine Democracy. The Politics Of Institutional Weakness

La autora realiza un estudio comparativo de las reformas de mercado qu e partidos populistas de base laboral, que habían promovido el protecc ionismo y la intervención estatal durante la posguerra, realizaron a f inales de la década de 1980 en Argentina, México y Venezuela. Las refo rmas implementadas por gobiernos del Partido Justicialista (Argentina) , del PRI (México) y de Acción Democrática (Venezuela) generaron nuevo s desafíos para los sindicatos históricamente aliados con estos partid os en los tres países. Pese a que los desafíos generados por las refor mas eran similares, la interacción entre los sindicatos y los gobierno s populistas de base laboral fue distinta en los tres países, e inclus o varió en el seno de cada uno de ellos.Para explicar esta distinta in teracción, Victoria Murillo utiliza tres variables principales: la lea ltad partidaria, la competencia intersindical por el liderazgo de las organizaciones, y la competencia intrasindical por los afiliados a sus organizaciones. La

Argentine Democracy. The Politics Of Institutional Weakness

Sindicalismo, coaliciones partidarias y reformas de mercado en américa latina (2016)